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I. INTRODUCTION 
No one has thought about the role of the general counsel 
more deeply than Geoff Hazard. The role of a lawyer in an 
organization raises fundamental questions about both the role of 
the lawyer as well as the key and contested question of “Who is 
                                                     
 ∗ Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law and Co-Director of the 
Institute for Law & Economics, University of Pennsylvania Law School. The Author was a 
speaker at the Thirteenth Annual Houston Law Review Frankel Lecture on November 7, 
2008, where he presented an initial version of this Commentary. 
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the client?” In his article Legal and Managerial “Cultures” in 
Corporate Representation, Geoff pushes the analysis forward by 
introducing “culture” into the analysis and by urging us to look to 
the sociological literature to better understand the role of a 
general counsel in a corporation.1 
The most important move in Geoff’s turn to the sociological 
literature, I submit, is to push us to examine closely the 
organizational context in which lawyers interact with their 
management colleagues. By invoking the concept of “culture,” 
what Geoff ultimately forces us to do is to recognize: (1) that 
organizations are heterogeneous; (2) that broad principles (e.g., 
“independent professional judgment,” “the client is the corporate 
juridical entity”) are only given substance in concrete contexts; 
and (3) that much of the real work of understanding the role of 
lawyers in organizations can only be done at the level of specific 
organizations with distinctive organizational cultures. 
In this brief response, I want to extend Geoff’s analysis into 
a context that he does not address in his article and to begin to 
think through how it might help us understand the role of the 
lawyer in a somewhat different organizational context: the 
nonprofit corporation. Indeed, because this is too broad and 
heterogeneous a category to be useful, let me make it even more 
specific: the role of the general counsel in a university. 
These are preliminary and rather uninformed comments—
more questions than answers. I should emphasize that I have 
never worked as a lawyer for a university, have never 
represented a university, and have never worked as in-house 
counsel for a for-profit corporation either. Instead, I come to this 
question with a background in corporate law (which I’ve taught 
for the last twenty years), and as one who has, of late, become 
interested in and started teaching about nonprofit organizations. 
I have also been a member of a university for the past twenty 
years and thus have a native’s understanding—and inevitable 
misunderstanding—of one university. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Let me start with some basic building blocks. First, what is 
the difference between a for-profit and a nonprofit corporation 
such as a university? The key difference from which all sorts of 
other differences flow is the “nondistribution constraint.” Unlike 
a for-profit corporation, which may distribute excess cash flows to 
                                                     
 1. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Legal and Managerial “Cultures” in Corporate 
Representation, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009). 
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its shareholders by paying dividends, buying back shares, or 
liquidating, a nonprofit corporation is prohibited from making 
distributions. 
This nondistribution constraint has two immediate 
consequences. First, it means that there are no shareholders to 
elect directors, to buy new shares to finance new projects, to sell 
their shares and thereby sell control, to approve or veto major 
decisions, or to sue faithless fiduciaries. Second, and related, the 
complicated question in corporate law of “for whom is the 
corporation managed?” instantly becomes even more difficult and 
contested. For whom is a university managed? Consider briefly 
some of the implications of these features. 
In the for-profit corporation, the roles played by 
shareholders mean that, as a theoretical and practical matter, 
the corporation will ultimately be managed for the shareholders. 
Great discretion is given to the managers in how they maximize 
shareholder value and even, in the short term, whether they 
maximize shareholder value. However, because only 
shareholders vote for directors, directors ultimately work for 
shareholders or else they are displaced. This power, though 
rarely exercised, means that the working answer to the question 
“For whom is the corporation managed?” is “ultimately, the 
shareholders.” 
Let us now turn to the parallel question, “For whom is the 
nonprofit corporation managed?” or more precisely, “For whom is 
the university managed?” Is there any group connected to a 
university that serves the same role as the shareholders of a for-
profit firm? 
III. THE UNIVERSITY:  
A HIGHLY STYLIZED AND INCOMPLETE ACCOUNT  
Consider the modern American university. Because it is 
subject to the nondistribution constraint, there are obviously no 
shareholders. But now think about the implications of this simple 
difference. First, how is the university to gather the “locked-in” 
capital to fund its operations? The sources of funds for a 
university are tuition, government grants, and donations. Tuition 
is largely “fee for service.” It is a payment in exchange for one of 
the products that the university produces, namely, education. 
Government grants often fund particular activities such as basic 
research. Donations to the university constitute the principal 
source of what the for-profit world considers “equity capital,” and 
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for American universities, these gifts overwhelmingly come from 
alumni.2 
How do we convince alumni to donate the large sums that 
they do? It is obviously a complex process, but one essential 
factor is that donors feel a sense of identification with the 
university. For the largest givers, this sometimes includes 
membership on the university’s board of trustees. But, as with 
other nonprofits, big donors often wish to serve on the board 
without bearing significant fiduciary responsibilities. Here we 
see a second huge difference between for-profits and universities: 
the roles of their boards of directors, including the identity of the 
directors and their understanding of what they are supposed to 
be doing, are fundamentally different. University boards 
generally are far larger than boards of publicly held companies, 
and the tasks performed by each vary greatly. 
In light of the alumni’s role in providing the “equity capital” 
of the university, and their domination of the board of directors, 
would it be descriptively accurate to say that the university is 
managed for the alumni? Not in any robust sense. While it is true 
that alumni are “residual beneficiaries” in a certain sense—the 
current “value” of their degrees depends in part on the current 
success of the university—they have minimal control rights, little 
ability to intervene, and limited knowledge about what is going 
on. Indeed, the difficulties with thinking of alumni as parallel to 
shareholders are illustrated by the problems that universities 
like Dartmouth, which give the broad mass of alumni important 
roles in electing directors, encounter when they seek to change 
the direction of the university. 
Would it be descriptively accurate to say that the university 
is run for the students? Again, while it is clear that students are 
important “stakeholders” in the university, there are vast areas 
of university activities that do not relate directly to teaching 
students. In particular, students have often complained that the 
focus on research—both in allocating resources as well as in 
selecting and tenuring faculty—is inconsistent with the teaching 
mission (at least until the students graduate and instantly 
become more interested in high profile, famous faculty than in 
how well they teach!). 
Other nonprofit institutions face a similar question when 
they determine for whom their organization is operated. My 
                                                     
 2. See R.G. Ehrenberg & C.L. Smith, The Sources and Uses of Annual Giving at 
Selective Private Research Universities and Liberal Arts Colleges, 22 ECON. EDUC. REV. 
223, 224–27 (2003) (showing that alumni have consistently donated more than other 
individuals, foundations, and corporations). 
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colleague Michael Fitts and I taught a seminar together on 
nonprofits this year. Ralph Muller, who runs the University of 
Pennsylvania Health System, came to talk to the class about 
managing a health care nonprofit. Muller took a health system 
that was losing hundreds of millions of dollars and turned it into 
one that is making hundreds of millions of dollars. What is his 
goal? How does he answer the question “For whom is the health 
system managed?”  
He sees himself as seeking to make the health system the 
best academic medical center it can be in teaching and research, 
as measured by the aspirations of his faculty and faculty 
members at other universities whom they would like to recruit. 
As it happens, top medical researchers like to perform 
complicated procedures: the more complicated the better. 
Fortunately, those are areas in which Penn can achieve a degree 
of market power, thereby allowing it to charge high prices and to 
use the profits to subsidize research or obstetric care, for 
instance. Why acquire Pennsylvania Hospital and build it into 
the largest provider of obstetric care in Philadelphia (delivering 
40% of the babies born in Philadelphia) when you lose money on 
every baby you deliver? Simply put, Penn cannot train doctors 
without teaching them how to deliver babies. 
Defining the mission in this way has content. The goal is not 
to maximize profits. Were that his goal, he could make even more 
money for the university by buying some additional hospitals. 
The goal is also not maximizing the delivery of charity care, 
although substantial charity care is provided. Nonprofit does not 
mean nice. 
One of the things that corporate law teaches is that while 
the corporation may be managed for the benefit of the 
shareholders, that does not mean it is managed by the 
shareholders themselves. Systems differ in how they structure 
the relationship between the shareholders and the board of 
directors. In the nonprofit context, things are even more 
complicated: the administrative hierarchy of the typical 
university does not, in reality, reflect who calls the shots. 
Although the board of trustees—nominally the legal source of all 
power—may have significant input into matters such as 
endowment investment policy, the overall budget, and in some 
cases, the hiring and firing of the university president, most of 
the critical decisions in the university are inevitably made by the 
tenured faculty who are beyond the reach of both the 
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administrators and the board of trustees.3 Even worse from a 
management perspective is that the content of the maximand (to 
maximize the excellence of the teaching and research mission of 
the university) will be deeply contested by the different interest 
groups within the university. A management structure in which 
the top of the hierarchy cannot, even in principle, redirect the 
course of the firm is, to corporate law eyes, a very odd one 
indeed.4 
IV. SO WHAT’S A GENERAL COUNSEL TO DO? 
So far, I’ve been talking at a pretty general level, a level at 
which both Geoff and I agree not much progress can be made. To 
give the discussion some content, I’d like to consider some 
challenges that the general counsel at Penn—who has varied 
over the years—has confronted. In each case, I know about the 
issue but complacently retain a tenured faculty member’s perfect 
ignorance of the actual facts. I also know nothing about how 
these issues were in fact handled by the general counsels who 
were stuck with the responsibility. These cases are better 
thought of as law school hypos based loosely on real world events. 
                                                     
 3. See José A. Cabranes, Myth and Reality of University Trusteeship in the Post-
Enron Era, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 960–61 (2007) (“Regardless of the role of the 
trustees as legal representatives of the university in its dealings with external forces, it is 
still the faculty that actually governs.”). 
 4. This fundamental ambiguity is nicely captured by a long time University 
general counsel: 
  What we have in a college or a university is a perpetual corporate entity 
with a sublime mission transcending its managers and its current constituency; 
a sublime cause in a corporate form. Unlike the case with most corporations, 
there is a duality between management of the corporation and stewardship over 
the cause. To manage the university corporation is not to manage its essential 
subject matter, which is knowledge and our cultural traditions. This is different 
from the business corporation selling products or services for a profit, where the 
products and the services and the profits are all within the ambit of corporate 
management. The very essence of a business corporation is managed by its board 
members and officers; the essence of the university is not. 
  The board members and administrators of a university have all the powers 
over the formal corporate entity that the directors and officers of a business 
corporation have, and are viewed by the state and the legal system as managers 
of the entity; but as to the very essence of the entity, they are not managers at 
all. They are facilitators. This duality provides fertile ground for ambiguity . . . . 
   . . . . 
  When college presidents say the faculty are the college; [and] when the 
faculty say they do not manage the institution at all . . . there is more ambiguity 
than I can eliminate in forty-five minutes or in a career. Yet I think the duality 
of essential mission on the one hand, and corporate management designed to 
facilitate that mission on the other, is useful to keep in mind. 
John A. Beach, The Management and Governance of Academic Institutions, 12 J.C. & U.L. 
301, 326–27 (1985) (footnotes omitted). 
Do Not Delete  3/28/2009  10:29 AM 
2009] THE NONPROFIT GENERAL COUNSEL 23 
I should also add that there are large aspects of the university 
counsel’s role that are not captured by these hypos. University 
lawyers worry about an incredible range of legal matters 
including employment matters, licensing agreements, landlord–
tenant issues, liquor licenses, hotels, concert halls and theaters, 
health care providers on a huge scale, and so forth. I have very 
few answers about what the general counsel of a university 
should do, but I feel a great deal of sympathy for the incredible 
difficulty of the position. These perhaps idiosyncratic examples, 
however, present some of the problems raised by the essential 
contestability of the core mission. 
A. Two Contrasting Cases: Water Buffalo and High Rise Sex  
Let me start with a pair of contrasting cases involving 
student misconduct.  
Hypo 1: Water Buffalo 
Late one night in January 1993, a student, annoyed by noise 
from the dispersal of a sorority party, yelled from his window, 
“Shut up, you water buffaloes!” The sorority sisters were African-
American. The shouting student was white. The sorority sisters 
filed a complaint with the university’s disciplinary body alleging 
a violation of the university’s racial harassment policy, which 
prohibited the use of racial epithets, even though no one could 
find any evidence that the term “water buffalo” had ever been 
used in that manner. From these rather pedestrian facts arose a 
public storm that made its way into the Wall Street Journal and 
ultimately into the confirmation hearings of Sheldon Hackney, 
Penn’s then-president, who was nominated to head the National 
Endowment of the Humanities.5 Once the sorority sisters filed a 
complaint, the procedure took on a life of its own. The judicial 
inquiry officer investigated the incident, pursued the case, and 
offered a settlement to the student, which he rejected. The 
matter lingered for months and became “Exhibit A” in the culture 
wars of political correctness run wild.6  
                                                     
 5. See Editorial, Buffaloed at Penn, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 1993, at A12 (noting the 
absurdity of the racial harassment allegations). 
 6. For a further account of the incident, see Alissa Kaye, Controversial ‘Water 
Buffalo’ Case Continues, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN, May 14, 1993, available at 
http://media.www.dailypennsylvanian.com/media/storage/paper882/news/1993/05/14/Resources/
Graduation.Controversial.water.Buffalo.Case.Continues-2188649.shtml. 
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Hypo 2: High Rise Sex 
One afternoon in September 2005, a student couple had a 
sexual encounter. For reasons that were never fully explained, 
they ended up having sex against the window of his or her room 
in “High Rise North,” a multi-story dorm at Penn with very large 
windows. As one might imagine, a crowd gathered and, in this 
age of digital photography, some pictures were taken. Some of 
those pictures ended up on the personal website of one of the 
onlookers and thus became available to the whole World Wide 
Web. The girl in the picture soon thought better of things and 
complained to the university’s Office of Student Conduct (OSC), 
which charged the photographer–poster with violating the 
university’s code of student conduct, sexual harassment policy, 
and policy on acceptable uses of electronic resources.7 According 
to press reports, the charge stated that the student “posted 
naked pictures of another University of Pennsylvania student on 
[his] personal Web site through the University’s servers, without 
that student’s authorization and in a manner highly invasive of 
the student’s privacy.”8 According to the memo, the posting 
caused one of the pictured students “serious distress” and created 
“an intimidating living environment for her.” The OSC proposal 
called for the photographer to be placed on disciplinary probation 
until graduation and required that he write an essay “discussing 
what was wrong with the conduct [he was] involved in” and a 
letter of apology. The student rejected the OSC’s proposed 
resolution and asked for a disciplinary hearing. Within days of 
the story becoming public, however, the university decided to 
drop all disciplinary charges.9 Within a week, the incident, which 
was beginning to attract national attention, was largely 
forgotten. 
In these two contrasting cases, we see one of the most 
difficult aspects of a university general counsel’s job: reconciling 
the university’s internal procedures, administered by deeply 
committed employees, with the university’s long term goals. In 
“Water Buffalo,” the president took the public position that those 
procedures had to take their course and that there was nothing 
                                                     
 7. Jason Schwartz, Racy Photo Lands Student in Trouble, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN, 
Nov. 30, 2005, available at http://media.www.dailypennsylvanian.com/media/storage/ 
paper882/news/2005/11/30/News/Racy-Photo.Lands.Student.In.Trouble-2146436.shtml. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Jason Schwartz, University Drops All Charges Against Photographer, DAILY 
PENNSYLVANIAN, Dec. 1, 2005, available at http://media.www.dailypennsylvanian.com/ 
media/storage/paper882/news/2005/12/01/BreakingNews/University.Drops.All.Charges. 
Against.Photographer-2146464.shtml. 
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he could do to bring matters to a swift conclusion. The result was 
a personal and public relations disaster for everyone involved: 
the university, the president, and the individual students. In 
retrospect, it would have been far better for everyone involved if 
someone—the general counsel, the provost, the president—had 
made the issue “go away” at the beginning. “High Rise Sex,” as 
salacious as it was for a few days, quickly disappeared. 
But—and here’s the challenge—when a university has 
procedures in place, making an incident disappear in the 
interests of all (or most) of those involved is a delicate and 
difficult mission that requires a combination of insight, 
diplomacy, and tact. While there are obviously parallels in the 
for-profit world, the differences in context show the unique 
nature of the challenges faced by universities. At Penn, I have no 
doubt that the institutional memory of the “Water Buffalo” 
incident made it easier to get rid of the “High Rise Sex” matter. 
B. The Solomon Amendment  
Next, consider the problems raised when traditional notions 
of academic autonomy clash with governmental directives. The 
University of Pennsylvania Law School prohibits employers who 
discriminate from using its placement facilities: 
The University of Pennsylvania and its Law School do not 
discriminate on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, 
gender identity, religion, color, national or ethnic origin, 
age, disability, or status as a Vietnam Era Veteran or 
disabled veteran. Employers utilizing our Career Planning 
facilities will be held to the same standard of non-
discrimination.10 
Many universities have taken the position that the military’s 
“don’t ask, don’t tell” policy impermissibly discriminates on the 
basis of sexual orientation. As a result, many of those 
universities, including Penn, banned the military from using 
campus career planning facilities. In 1996, to counteract this 
trend, Congress enacted the Solomon Amendment, which 
withheld all federal funding for any university that, in the 
determination of the Secretary of Defense, has: 
[A] policy or practice (regardless of when implemented) that 
either prohibits, or in effect prevents . . . the Secretary of a 
military department or Secretary of Homeland Security 
from gaining access to campuses, or access to students (who 
                                                     
 10. Univ. of Pa. Law School, On-Campus Recruiting, http://www.law.upenn.edu/cpp/ 
employer/recruiting/oncampus/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2009). 
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are 17 years of age or older) on campuses, for purposes of 
military recruiting in a manner that is at least equal in 
quality and scope to the access to campuses and to students 
that is provided to any other employer . . . .11 
Because large research universities like Penn receive huge 
amounts of federal money for research, student aid, and other 
purposes, the university took the position that, as much as it 
condemned the congressional policy, it would comply. Indeed, 
“the University President ordered the Law School not to enforce 
its antidiscrimination policy against military recruiters.”12  
Although members of the law faculty believed that the 
Solomon Amendment was unconstitutional, the university did 
not want to challenge it. Frustrated with the university’s 
unwillingness to mount a constitutional challenge, members of 
the law faculty, along with some students, brought a declaratory 
judgment action alleging that the university’s preexisting policies 
complied with the requirements of the Solomon Amendment 
because they allowed military recruiters alternative and 
arguably equivalent access to students.13 Ultimately, of course, 
the Supreme Court upheld the Solomon Amendment.14  
My interest in this regard is not the constitutional question 
but rather the legal issue of standing and the parallel 
institutional questions. Imagine for a moment some regulation 
impinging on General Motors (GM), a regulation that the people 
who worked at Chevrolet thought outrageous. GM managers, 
including the general counsel, decide for a variety of reasons that 
GM will not challenge the regulation. Is it even conceivable that 
Chevy would challenge it independently? Or that some of the top 
managers at Chevy would decide to challenge it in their quasi-
individual capacity? Of course not. But the nature of a university, 
in which the faculty and the students both have some grounds for 
believing that they are the university (and the peculiar 
stubbornness and creativity of law professors), makes such a 
scenario much less surprising. But how then does a general 
counsel chart the legal strategy of the university when there are 
all these law professors who think they know better and are 
                                                     
 11. 10 U.S.C. § 983(b) (2006). 
 12. Burbank v. Rumsfeld, No. Civ.A. 03-5497, 2004 WL 1925532, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 
Aug. 26, 2004). 
 13. Id. at *1–2. 
 14. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 60, 70 
(2006) (ruling that the Solomon Amendment was constitutional because it did not violate 
a law school’s freedom of speech or association). 
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willing to spend hours arguing or even litigating their position? It 
boggles my corporate lawyer’s mind. 
C. Adelphi and Reporting Up the Ladder  
My final example is a less amusing one and brings us back to 
some of the core themes of Geoff Hazard’s paper. Adelphi 
University is located on Long Island, New York. Peter 
Diamandopoulos became its president in 1985. He had ambitious 
plans for the university. However, by 1995, he had lost the 
support of all of the constituencies in the university except for 
the board of trustees. The New York Board of Regents, an 
independent body appointed by the state legislature, has power 
to remove trustees for “neglect of duty.” Responding to 
newspaper accounts revealing that Diamandopoulos was the 
second highest paid college president in the country, the Board of 
Regents investigated and, after uncovering a combination of 
incompetence, neglect of duty, and conflicts of interest, replaced 
eighteen of the Adelphi University trustees.15  
I have no idea whether Adelphi had a general counsel or 
what he or she did or did not do. My interest in this case is 
different: when you have a governing board that does not 
govern—as is the case in most nonprofit corporations—what 
happens to the concept of “reporting up”? 
Under Rule 1.13(b) of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct:  
If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, 
employee or other person associated with the organization 
is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a 
matter related to the representation that is a violation of a 
legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law 
that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and 
that is likely to result in substantial injury to the 
organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably 
necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless 
the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in 
the best interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer 
shall refer the matter to higher authority in the 
organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances, 
to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the 
organization as determined by applicable law.16 
                                                     
 15. Bruce Lambert, New York Regents Oust 18 Trustees from Adelphi U., N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 11, 1997, at A1. 
 16. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2008). 
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As noted above, under applicable nonprofit corporate law, 
the “highest authority” that can act on behalf of a nonprofit 
corporation is its board of directors. The problem, of course, is 
that the board of directors of most nonprofit corporations is 
uninvolved. When, as anticipated under Rule 1.13, the lawyer 
believes that, say, the president is engaging in conduct that 
violates a legal obligation to the organization, what should the 
lawyer do? Although the comments to Rule 1.13 address 
differences between the roles of government lawyers and lawyers 
in private organizations, no attention is paid to the nonprofit 
sector.17  
Rule 1.13 is but one development in the evolution of the role 
of lawyers for organizations. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act 
implements most of Rule 1.13 in the public company context and 
mandates an effective “reporting up” process in which counsel 
must:  
[R]eport evidence of a material violation of securities law or 
breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company 
or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief 
executive officer of the company (or the equivalent thereof); 
and . . . if the counsel or officer does not appropriately 
respond to the evidence (adopting, as necessary, 
appropriate remedial measures or sanctions with respect to 
the violation), requiring the attorney to report the evidence 
to the audit committee of the board of directors of the issuer 
or to another committee of the board of directors comprised 
solely of directors not employed directly or indirectly by the 
issuer, or to the board of directors.18 
This has given rise to the concept of a qualified legal 
compliance committee (QLCC). As the statutory provision 
indicates, this may normally be the audit committee but need not 
be.19 Although the Sarbanes–Oxley Act does not apply to 
nonprofit corporations, the standards of governance established 
in it have become a source of wisdom for better-counseled 
nonprofits. Who was the QLCC at Adelphi? Who is the QLCC at 
Penn? Here, of course, we return to the question with which I 
                                                     
 17. For a valuable discussion of reporting up in the nonprofit corporation, see 
generally Michael W. Peregrine, James R. Schwartz & William W. Horton, ‘Up the 
Ladder’ Counsel Reporting Processes for the Nonpublic/Nonprofit Corporation, 2 CORP. 
ACCOUNTABILITY REP. 423 (2004). 
 18. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006). This section of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act is implemented 
in 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2008). 
 19. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(k) (2008) (providing that the QLCC may consist of a 
member of an equivalent committee of independent directors if the issuer lacks an audit 
committee). 
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started: the governance of the nonprofit. For all of the complexity 
or even incoherence of university governance, and for all of the 
ambiguity of the role of the university’s board of trustees, at a 
minimum, a university board of trustees should have an audit 
committee that can play the role of a higher authority, a role that 
should be broadcast widely to all members of the university 
community. 
What does my university do in this regard? Having no first 
hand experience, I went online to see what I could find out. There 
is, of course, a webpage devoted to the board of trustees in which 
we are told that: 
  Formal institutional governance and fiduciary 
responsibility for the University of Pennsylvania rest solely 
with its Board of Trustees. The trustees delegate the 
responsibility for the day-to-day management of the 
University of Pennsylvania to the administration and, in 
particular, to the president. For this reason, one of the most 
important responsibilities of the trustees is the selection, 
retention, and replacement of the president. The trustees, 
however, seek to support and reinforce the administration 
in several ways. They serve as a bridge between the 
University and the world; on the one hand, interpreting the 
institution to the public, and on the other hand, bringing in 
experience and perceptions gained outside the University. 
The trustees provide leadership in the identification and 
development of financial resources. They oversee the 
University’s relations with other institutions, the private 
sector, government bodies, and the media. In consultation 
with the president, the trustees determine the long-range 
allocation of resources, making decisions in the context of 
the needs and expectations of the University’s 
constituencies and of society.  
  The primary work of the trustees is carried out by eleven 
committees: Academic Policy, Audit and Compliance, 
Budget and Finance, Compensation, Development, External 
Affairs, Facilities and Campus Planning, Honorary Degrees 
and Awards, Neighborhood Initiatives, Nominating, and 
Student Life. An Executive Committee is empowered to act 
on behalf of the trustees between meetings of the full board, 
which are held in the winter, spring and fall.20 
This is nice, as far as it goes. By clicking on the tab for “The 
Trustees,” one can find out who they are. It turns out that there 
are some fifty-eight very eminent men and women who serve as 
                                                     
 20. Univ. of Pa., Board of Trustees, http://www.upenn.edu/secretary/trustees/ 
index.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2009). 
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trustees. But who serves on the key committees? Who is on the 
audit and compliance committee? The executive committee? 
There are no tabs for individual committees and no easy way (at 
least for me) to find out who is on which committee. By contrast, 
of course, one need only look at Goldman Sachs’ “investors” 
webpage to find out who is on which committee, including the 
identity of the chair.21  
V. CONCLUSION 
What can we learn from this? There are, it seems to me, a 
number of lessons. First, because the very mission of nonprofits 
is contested and can be captured by different stakeholders, 
individual nonprofits will have very different organizational 
cultures. The crazy peculiarities of universities are almost a 
parody of this point. How lawyers function within these cultures 
will thus be quite specific to their organizations.  
Second, the actual distribution of authority and 
responsibility within an organization—what procedures are in 
place, who runs those procedures, who has the critical 
information, and who makes the critical judgments—will 
determine the lawyer’s actual role. 
Third, for all of the uniqueness and contestability of 
nonprofit organizations, legal structure still matters. The history 
of the last 50 years of corporate law is the story of putting new 
wine in old bottles. In the 1960s, it was recognized that the board 
of directors of a modern publicly traded corporation cannot 
manage the firm and any normative expectation that the 
“business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by or 
under the direction of its board of directors” would be 
disappointed.22 So, instead of expecting the board to manage, new 
tasks were invented for the institution, giving birth to the 
“monitoring board.” The monitoring board developed over time: 
beginning with the SEC studies in the 1960s, continuing with 
scholarly writing, finding acceptance—and controversy—in the 
ALI’s Principles of Corporate Governance, and culminating in 
Sarbanes–Oxley and the stock exchange reforms it mandates. 
Now, it is the accepted understanding of what the board of 
directors is supposed to do. 
                                                     
 21. See Goldman Sachs, Investors, http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-firm/ 
investors/corporate-governance/index.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2009). 
 22. LITIGATION ISSUES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF SECURITIES: AN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 416 (William G. Horton & Gerhard Wegen eds., 1997) (quoting WILLIAM E. 
KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 1.02, at 
3–4 (4th ed. 1988)). 
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A similar process of redefinition is required in the nonprofit 
sector. Nonprofits have boards that clearly cannot and do not 
manage the nonprofit. But they are there and can be tasked with 
some key functions, one of which is to monitor the top 
management. At the very least, one should expect that university 
boards will have audit committees that perform on par with 
those of for-profit boards, with the same access to information, 
experts, and advice. 
Geoff Hazard has spent his career thinking about the role of 
lawyers. He has done so with a characteristic style: grounded in 
institutional reality, no-nonsense, appropriately cynical, and 
occasionally aspirational. It is this set of qualities that are 
needed to understand the role of the lawyer in nonprofit 
organizations. 
 
